Scholarship examining U.S. homeland security policy proceeds from the assumption that homeland security policy-making is a largely domestic-that is, United States-centric-endeavor. This article challenges that assumption. The mission of the Homeland Security Enterprise is domestic security but achieving a satisfactory state of preparation, prevention, response, recovery and resilience requires efforts that extend beyond our boundaries. We argue that advances in technology and globalization have accelerated the degree to which global events directly and indirectly influence U.S. homeland security. Contemporary threats do not recognize national boundaries; efforts to counter them, accordingly, must transcend border lines as well. In this article, we present evidence from the homeland security sub-fields of border security, counterterrorism, cybersecurity, public health, and disaster management to show that U.S. homeland security policy is now inherently transnational in nature and therefore best analyzed and understood by taking a broader, global perspective.
principles such as mutual respect for the territorial integrity of states, agreements not to interfere in other nations' internal affairs, and the legal equality of nation-states within the broader international system.
As European influence spread globally, these pronounced concepts of sovereignty and nationality, and the prerogatives and implications which attached to them, were disseminated, as well.
Today, sovereignty asserts itself at national borders by determining who and what may enter, exit, or cross the space. 17 This exercise of sovereignty along nation-states' borders has long been a means for governments to assert and maintain internal political control. 18 At the same time, nations levy customs and travel fees on the cross-border movement of people and goods to generate revenue. Borders today can therefore be thought of as both lines of sovereignty and points of flow. This new understanding of borders as lines and flows challenges the Westphalian conception of borders solely as "hard" boundaries around sovereign nation-states.
To be clear, we are not suggesting that sovereign borders have become irrelevant or unimportant. However, because of accelerating technological innovation, time and space have been dramatically compressed such that global flows today are non-stop, and in many cases, instantaneous.
Globalization is the cumulative effect of these trends: a 24/7/365 movement continuously around the world of capital, labor, cargo, people, goods, services, ideas, images, data, and electrons. These flows today often operate independent of nation-states. They are the decisions of actors such as multinational corporations, terrorist movements, transnational criminal organizations, and other non-state actors. For this reason, they are sometimes referred to as "borderless" or "stateless" of various government agencies. As it stands now, the responsibility for counterterrorist initiatives is divided." 23 Others scholars took up this theme of how to organize government agencies more effectively to combat terrorism in subsequent years.
Later research explored the ways in which misaligned U.S. agency and departmental missions left open significant gaps in the United States' ability to deter, prevent, and respond to terrorist attacks. 24 These analyses focused on domestic policy affairs. Writing in spring 2001, Richard
Falkenrath described a White House in the late 1990s which sought to coordinate a sprawling range of counterterrorism programs across the executive branch-a situation similar to conditions in the executive branch today. 25 Falkenrath included a small reference to U.S. international counterterrorism assistance programs, but he placed this reference in a domestic policy context: "U.S. officials argue that [providing international
counterterrorism assistance] has had considerable success in promoting greater counterterrorism efforts and discreet cooperation among other states, especially in curtailing state sponsorship of international terrorism.
Critics argue that the U.S. response is excessive." 26 Widely cited work published in the decade following the 9/11 terrorist attacks similarly focused on domestic policy-making and politics. For example, one 2009 study on the growing linkages among internal and external security problems used a primarily European perspective for its analyses. 28 This research pointed out that most security studies scholarship "very rarely" ties together international and domestic security problems, underlining the need for the present study, which focuses on the transnational dimensions of U.S. homeland security. 29 Other research has examined related issues, such as the connections among crossborder migration and globalization-related phenomena like trade, or the collective action problems that can arise when multiple nations attempt to coordinate their respective counterterrorism policies. 30 Later post-9/11 research continued to emphasize domestic policy concerns by examining, for instance, domestic inter-organizational coordination in response to disasters and prevention of global pandemics that may make their way to U.S. shores. 31 To be sure, federal agencies that later were folded into the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) had, to varying degrees, established international ties with foreign counterpart agencies prior to 9/11. 35 Other non-DHS agencies that today form part of the homeland security enterprise, such as the CIA, also worked with international partners before the 9/11 attacks. 36 Moreover, international groups, such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), have acted for years as hubs for the exchange of important information among their members.
Nevertheless, we maintain that there at least two key differences between these pre-9/11 international activities and the types of transnational homeland security initiatives that are apparent today. First, international cooperation pre-dating the 9/11 attacks was largely ad-hoc, in the sense that it was not geared toward achieving a cohesive group of policy goals that transcended multiple government agencies. Second, pre-9/11 global collaboration along these lines was not born out of the recognition that tackling U.S. homeland security threats abroad-in a systematic fashioncan yield domestic security dividends. Rather, this pre-9/11 collaboration was oriented toward solving discrete sets of policy problems that were bounded by the specific missions of the government agencies participating in these partnerships. 37 In both form and substance, then, transnational homeland security activities today represent a fundamental break from past practice.
It is now essential to advance understandings of the transnational dimensions of U.S. homeland security to increase knowledge of policy options and limitations in the homeland security sphere. By framing Journal of Strategic Security, Vol. 11, No. 3 https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol11/iss3/2 DOI: https://doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.11.3.1689 homeland security in a transnational security context, policy-makers stand to make better-informed decisions about how to formulate strategies and allocate scarce time and resources to achieve their homeland security objectives. At the same time, understanding the transnational dimensions of homeland security fosters awareness of the limitations of internal security policies limited to the domestic context. 38 It is also imperative to bring current homeland security scholarship into line with contemporary practices in homeland security. Squaring homeland security as it is conducted with the broader literature on homeland security policy can benefit scholars by offering a more accurate assessment of policy conditions, which in turn can lead to analyses that are more precise. We next turn to the first of five homeland security subfields that this article examines: border security.
BORDER SECURITY
U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) secures and expedites the movement of people and goods across U.S. borders. 39 In a globalized world, where technology has accelerated both transport and communication, the ports of entry at air, sea, and land borders have become the last line of defense, rather than the first, as they Amsterdam bound for Detroit. CBP officers planned to refer him for secondary inspection upon his arrival in the United States. However, this obviously would have been too late to prevent Abdulmutallab from blowing up the plane. Therefore, in retrospect, the "border" we needed to focus on was located not in Detroit, but at Schipol Airport in the Netherlands. 40 The goal of border security, too, needed to change in The preclearance program has produced encouraging results. A 2017 report by the Government Accountability Office (GAO), a federal watchdog, found that preclearance programs prevented over 10,000 potentially dangerous passengers from boarding aircraft bound for the CBP's Container Security Initiative (CSI) complements the preclearance program, in that it focuses on intercepting potentially hazardous cargo destined for the United States at departure points abroad. The CSI now has a presence at over 50 maritime ports around the world. 49 Dating from the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the CSI uses intelligence and automated tools to identify potentially high-risk containers that may contain weapons or weapons precursors that could be used by terrorists. 50 Containers that are deemed high-risk are then screened using other technologies, such as X-ray machines or radiation detection devices. 51 Some eighty percent of containers bound for the United States are now screened overseas through the CSI. 52 There is limited publicly available data on the effectiveness of the CSI. One 2015 GAO report indicated that CBP was not able to provide complete data on the disposition of certain containers that it had determined were high-risk. 53 This suggests that it is at least possible that certain highrisk containers were released from CBP custody without being properly screened or accounted for. Still, the CSI clearly represents an advance in cargo screening techniques for the United States, because it uses a systematic, intelligence-driven approach to target and screen higher risk cargo containers. In addition, it does so by enlisting time and space as early as possible and as far away geographically as possible before the goods arrive at U.S. ports of entry. 54 CBP also manages the Air Cargo Advance Screening Program (ACAS), which began in June 2018. 55 The program requires foreign entities to submit, in advance, information about the goods they are shipping to CBP. Moreover, it is worth underscoring that this information sharing with surveillance aircraft and uses these planes to collect intelligence on suspicious vessels, which it then relays to Coast Guard ships. 60 The Coast Guard ships, in turn, can set a course to intercept the suspicious vessels and determine whether they merit further investigation. Coast Guard personnel may also identify and stop potential drug trafficking on their own. For example, in 2013, a Coast Guard helicopter was used to shoot out the engine of a go-fast boat in the Caribbean, bound for the United States, carrying some $35 million dollars' worth of cocaine. 61 The Coast Guard also plays a part in stopping irregular migrants who attempt to make their way to the United States. In 2015, for instance, the Coast Guard began to see a sharp increase in the number of Cuban migrants intercepted in the Caribbean who were bound for the United States. 62 When the Coast Guard detains migrants at sea, the agency will usually transfer those detained migrants to ICE, which then arranges for the migrants to be returned to their countries of origin. 63 Interdictions of drugs and people like these are routine for the Coast Guard. In addition, they form part of a broader-based homeland security strategy. By conducting these operations in the Caribbean, the Coast Guard can stop the movement of potentially dangerous people and things toward the United States far from actual U.S. borders. The TSA carries out complementary operations in foreign airports with the aid of counterpart agencies.
The TSA must rely on foreign air transportation authorities to implement its security directives. 64 For example, in 2017 U.S. intelligence agencies learned of a plot by ISIS to embed explosives in electronic devices, such as laptops and tablets. 65 In response to this intelligence, the TSA issued new guidelines for U.S.-bound airline passengers that imposed restrictions on carrying certain devices in aircraft cabins. In the United Kingdom, for example, these guidelines effectively banned any device larger than a smartphone from being placed in carry-on luggage. 66 This example underscores the importance of close working relationships between the TSA and its counterparts abroad. Without these relationships, the TSA would have a much more difficult time ensuring the safety of U.S.-bound airline passengers. It is also worth noting that the TSA operates several programs related to the screening of cargo on passenger flights. 67 These programs outline the specific technologies that transportation firms can use to screen air cargo. The programs also provide a means for firms to become certified cargo carriers. 68 The operations discussed above by CBP, ICE, the Coast Guard, and TSA offer compelling evidence that the United States today takes an international approach to securing U.S. borders. These measures seek to push the point of security screening far from U.S. borders, thus reducing exclusive reliance on more rigorous screening at U.S. borders themselves.
Border security is closely linked to U.S. counterterrorism policy, which we address in the next section.
COUNTERTERRORISM
The United States' efforts to prevent terrorist attacks have led to a wide array of transnational counterterrorism initiatives undertaken on a "whole of government" basis. We explore here the military operations, economic Going Global the United States, in that it has proven adept at inspiring so-called "lone wolf" terrorists to strike targets inside the United States. 73 International economic sanctions are tools designed to cut off terrorist financing sources. These sanctions usually prohibit the transfer of money or goods between sanctioned persons or entities, businesses, and financial institutions. The United States must rely on foreign financial institutions and governments to execute these sanctions. Since the U.S. dollar is universally respected as a kind of "global currency," and given that U.S.
financial institutions act as a hub for an enormous number of international financial transactions each day, the U.S. government can compel foreign financial institutions and governments to implement these sanctions. In addition, foreign financial institutions can incur penalties for violating these sanctions. That can shut them out from the global financial system. member states to disrupt financial transactions that may benefit terrorist organizations. 76 President Donald Trump has signaled that he may impose financial sanctions on government officials in Pakistan if they do not stop promoting militant groups. 77 At the same time, it is important to note that financial sanctions are blunt tools that can trigger unforeseen consequences, such as discouraging banks from setting up operations in contested areas. Still, given that each U.S. presidential administration since the 9/11 attacks has used sanctions to target terrorist financing, it stands to reason that these sanctions-while limited in their effectiveness-will continue to be used for the foreseeable future. In a similar vein, foreign governments have also played important parts in sharing intelligence that benefits U.S. homeland security interests.
There have been dramatic increases in international intelligence cooperation for counterterrorism since the 9/11 attacks. This cooperation appears to have had a direct, positive impact upon U.S. homeland security. We acknowledge that intelligence is, by nature, secret. Success stories in the intelligence business are rarely made public. We must therefore rely on publicly available accounts of international intelligence sharing to assess its effects, both perceived and real.
Perhaps most notable among the United States' intelligence-sharing agreements is the so-called "Five Eyes" group, consisting of Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the United States. 78 The origins of the Five Eyes group can be traced to accords between the There are practical reasons that the United States shares intelligence with its allies. The United States is widely believed to be the most advanced of the Five Eyes members in terms of its ability to capture signals intelligence (SIGINT), such as emails, phone calls, and text messages. 83 The U.S. government shares SIGINT with other Five Eyes members. 84 At the same time, the United States has comparatively weak abilities to collect intelligence from human sources, or HUMINT. 85 Therefore, the United States must sometimes rely on the stronger HUMINT capabilities of its allies to collect HUMINT. 86 The differing comparative advantages of the United States and allied intelligence services can lead to exchanges. The United States' cooperation with the EU on cybersecurity issues dates to at least 2010. In that year, Obama administration officials and
EU representatives launched the Working Group on Cybercrime and
Cybersecurity to advance transatlantic cooperation for cybersecurity. 90 The Working Group collaborates on areas of mutual concern, such as cyber incident management and critical infrastructure protection. 91 The EU-US cooperation on cybersecurity issues will likely continue due in part to shared democratic values. 92 A 2014 EU-sponsored study published by the Center for Strategic and International Studies supports this idea, noting that there is great potential for transatlantic collaboration in These examples demonstrate that the DOS, working through international institutions, has taken steps that in its view advance U.S. security interests.
DHS has also leveraged its relationships with foreign governments and international organizations to advance U.S. cybersecurity interests. For example, since 2006 DHS has organized a biennial exercise called "Cyber Storm" to evaluate the abilities of U.S. government entities and U.S. allies to manage significant cyber events. 96 The most recent of these exercises, Cyber Storm V, took place in 2016, and incorporated teams from most U.S. federal agencies, many U.S. state governments, over two dozen businesses, and 12 partner nations, including Australia, Hungary, New Zealand, and Switzerland. 97 It is telling that DHS involved so many partner nations in Cyber Storm V. This broad involvement illustrates the extent to which DHS views international cooperation as essential to achieve its cybersecurity objectives. DHS has also emphasized internally the importance of expanding global cooperation for cybersecurity. The U.S.
Computer Emergency Response Team (US-CERT) and its counterparts abroad meet routinely, further demonstrating the importance DHS attaches to its international partners. 98 The need to strengthen international collaboration for cybersecurity The steps taken above to bolster the United States' cybersecurity capabilities take place amidst a rising tide of cyber threats. The Russian government, in particular, has ratcheted up efforts to delegitimize and destabilize the U.S. government using online tactics. 103 
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Port-au-Prince. The temblor destroyed 14 of 16 government ministry buildings, the presidential palace, and the parliament building, effectively decapitating the government. 123 The U.S. response to the earthquake began in dramatic fashion. Within hours after the earthquake, a Haitian government representative drove a motorbike to the residence of U.S. Ambassador Kenneth H. Merten and verbally delivered an official request for U.S. government assistance. 124
Within less than 24 hours, the first U.S. government team arrived in Haiti to begin assisting in the disaster recovery process. 125 President Obama designated USAID as the lead U.S. government agency for assisting in the recovery following the earthquake, though he also ordered the executive branch to employ a "whole of government" approach. 126 DHS contributed significantly to these "whole of government" efforts. Going Global made their way to the United States. 133 Detaining, interviewing, and processing these Haitians' immigration applications comes at significant cost to the U.S. government. By providing direct aid to Haiti following the 2010 earthquake, the U.S. government was essentially calculating that the cost of providing direct aid would prove less than the potential unknown future cost of managing a post-quake immigration wave from Haiti. In this way, providing direct disaster relief aid to Haiti served U.S. homeland security interests.
The U.S. transnational approach to disaster management has also worked in the other direction-that is, when U.S. allies assist the United States following disasters that take place inside the United States. Although little reported on at the time, large numbers of U.S. allies offered the United States government assistance following Hurricane Katrina in 2005. 134 The governments of Bangladesh, Thailand, Germany, and Kuwait sent money, equipment, and personnel to perform tasks like pump out flooded areas, feed disaster survivors, and rebuild damaged levees. 135 The U.S. government recognized the need to develop an integrated strategy to absorb and manage these sorts of donations in the future. As a result, in 2010 DHS published its International Assistance Strategy (IAS), which sought to develop an organized system for managing aid offers. The DOS was designated as the lead agency for coordinating foreign offers of assistance. 136 FEMA retains the sole authority under federal law to accept or reject offers of assistance. 137 Moreover, FEMA can make decisions regarding the disposition of potentially unused donations. 138 It is important to underscore that the IAS is not activated following every federal disaster declaration. The FEMA Administrator makes that decision depending upon the conditions he or she faces during the disaster in question. 139 Nevertheless, the existence of the IAS demonstrates that DHS recognizes the importance of a transnational approach to disaster management and has taken steps to integrate this transnational approach formally into its daily operations.
Domestic and international initiatives to address the effects of climate change further illustrate the degree to which disaster management has become transnational in scope. During the Obama administration, federal agencies were charged with developing plans, procedures, and strategies that would take account of the effects of climate change in preparation for the future. 140 To fulfill this charge, in 2013 DHS published a Climate Action Plan that linked the effects of climate change to DHS's five mission areas. 141 DHS maintains that the effects of climate change may exacerbate social tensions and political unrest in areas abroad where state capacity to address terrorism is limited. 142 As a result, climate change, at some level, may be one factor that can "enable" terrorist activity. 143 At least two studies support this finding, which suggests that natural disasters can lead to a rise in domestic and transnational terrorist activity. 144 The five homeland security sub-fields that we have assessed thus far in this article each illustrate the growing transnational orientation of U.S. homeland security policy. In the next section, we begin to outline some of the most significant implications of this transnational understanding of homeland security. We also offer suggestions for homeland security policymakers to integrate this new transnational approach to homeland security more effectively.
IMPLICATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
This article has shown that far from being a purely domestic matter, homeland security policy today has become transnational in nature, in that forces and events outside the United States affect U.S. homeland security policy, both directly and indirectly. There at least three major implications arising from this shift in our understanding of U.S. homeland security policy: first, this evolution has implications for institutions that formulate homeland security policies and suggests a functional realignment among the organizations charged to implement those policies. Second, this shift in perspective and paradigm helps illuminate a potential evolution in the federal approach to homeland security established in the wake of 9/11-an evolution that represents a more global understanding of the homeland security field. Third, the traditional frameworks scholars and policy analysts use to examine and assess homeland security may no longer provide useful research lenses or produce entirely accurate results. We examine each of these implications below. 
Going Global

Implications for Homeland Security Institutions
As we have shown, the federal government places homeland security officials abroad to protect the American homeland from external threats. 146 This change breaks down old dichotomies and definitions by which policymakers and analysts in the past drew distinctions with a difference. The activities of DHS agents and officers overseas blur the traditional boundaries between national security and law enforcement, on one hand, and law enforcement and border security, on the other. The subject matter of their missions more and more frequently coincides. For this reason, border security and law enforcement capabilities in the future may come to be viewed as another form of national power, alongside intelligence, military action, diplomatic activity, depth of financial capacity, and energy independence. We admittedly are at the threshold of exploring these shifts, but the requirement to examine them rigorously and systematically seems clear. 147 The federal government institutions dedicated to addressing homeland security issues also may no longer mesh well with the increasingly transnational nature of homeland security threats. Historically speaking, the National Security Council at the White House is the mechanism through which inter-agency disputes are resolved and "whole of There was, and remains, significant overlap among the HSC and NSC's memberships. 154 In light of these factors, merging the HSC and NSC into a single organization may align them better with the transnational nature of contemporary homeland security threats. 155 to do so. 156 The bulk of these agreements pertain to law enforcement cooperation and training, capacity building programs, and information sharing.
Implications for Homeland Security Functions
As DHS's international role expanded and its fragmented deployment was coordinated through regional strategies generated internally at DHS, significant tension resulted with the DOS. The DOS views itself, consistent with its role in the past, as the U.S. Government's exclusive voice in conducting U.S. foreign policy. It has been allocated exclusive legal authority, for example, to dispense foreign aid and assistance funds.
Yet considering the changed circumstances attendant to homeland security in a globalized context, it may be helpful for DHS to receive direct authority and appropriations from Congress to design, fund, and conduct law enforcement programs abroad. There may also be opportunities for funding comparable programs in border, aviation, and maritime security with other host governments. This could potentially facilitate greater return on DHS's relationships with foreign partners.
Implications for Homeland Security Scholarship
The analytical tools scholars use to assess U.S. homeland security policy may also need to adjust to the new transnational homeland security paradigm. Public policy research has a reputation for being "theory poor." 157 Public policy scholars frequently borrow or adapt theories and tools from other disciplines for policy studies of homeland security. Yet these theories and tools may no longer be adequate. Policy scholars may look to new sources for theoretical and analytical models. In particular, international relations and economics offer an array of robust theories with good explanatory power. These disciplines take account of governmental, organizational, and individual behavior in their theories.
Tools and theories from these disciplines may help scholars better understand the transnational forces that influence homeland security policy today. has had significant impacts on our understanding of homeland security.
Our international responsibilities have become critical to not only our physical security, but our economic security, as well. This means that U.S.
homeland security is a shared responsibility-among governments, the private sector, individuals, and communities. As these trends continue, it is nearly certain that the interconnections among U.S. homeland security policy and global security challenges will grow. Transnational homeland security is here to stay. Going Global
In January 2012, DHS Secretary Janet Napolitano proposed the U.S. National Strategy for Global Supply Chain Security on behalf of the Obama Administration at the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland. The strategy invoked international cooperation to enhance the efficient and secure flow of goods and the overall resilience of the global supply chain. The cornerstone of all this strategy is a risk assessment approach that recognizes that the vast majority of people and goods flowing across global borders are lawful and compliant. The goal is to identify and interdict the dangerous passengers and cargo from the otherwise lawful flows of goods and people. It is through a multi-layered security approach based on risk management that DHS can expedite travel and trade while focusing on the much smaller segment that requires additional screening and attention. The objective is to differentiate routinely between high-and low-risk subjects and expedite movement of the latter through the global system. The "trusted traveler" (Global Entry) and "trusted trader" (CTPAT) programs operated by CBP routinely recruit foreign based participants; The White House National Strategy for Global Supply Chain Security, January 2012, https:// obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/national_strategy_for_ global_supply_chain_security.pdf.
